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SURVEY OF OHIO LAW - 1956
common sense rule is that once the privilege is waived, the waiver cannot
be recalled. The information is no longer secret and its confidentiality
cannot be restored again by the withdrawal of the waiver. The purpose
of the statute has been defeated; therefore, the privilege no longer exists.1
"When confidence ceases, privilege ceases."
CLINTON DEWrr
FUTURE INTERESTS
General Testamentary Powers and the Rule
Against Perpetuities
The Probate Court of Cuyahoga County in Cleveland Trust Co. v.
McQuade' rendered a significant decision on the application of the com-
mon law rule against perpetuities to interests created under a general
power to appoint by will and not by deed.
In this litigation, S (settlor) created in 1922 a revocable inter vivos
trust with T(trustee) which became irrevocable the same year upon the
death of S. The trust agreement gave D(donee of power) a general
testamentary power to appoint a stated portion of the trust property. D
died testate in 1953, and appointed in his will this portion of the trust
property to T in trust for named beneficiaries. All of the interests
created under this power by D's will were valid under the Tule against
perpeuities if the period of the rule were computed from the date of the
exercise of the power, 'but not if this period were computed from the
date of the creation of the power.
T, as trustee under the 1922 trust and as executor and trustee under
D's will, brought an action for a declaratory judgment to determine the
proper application of -the rule against perpetuiries to D's appointments.
The probate court decided to follow the minority view as set forth in the
Wisconsin case of Miller v. Douglass,2 and held that since a general testa-
mentary power is substantially the same as a general power to appoint
by will or deed, the period of the rule against perpetuiies as to both types
of powers is to be computed from the date of the exercise of the power.
This policy decision of the probate court is based substantially upon
general crtcasms of the rule against perpetuities by Professors W Barton
'The decisions are legion. Representative ones are: Pittsburg, Cincinnati, C. & St.-
L.Ry. v. O'Connor, 171 Ind. 686, 85 N.E. 969 (1908); Demonbrun v. McHaffic,
348 Mo. 1120, 156 S.W.2d 923 (1941); Apter v. Home Life Ins. Co., 266 N.Y.
333, 194 N.E. 846, 98 A.L.R. 1281 (1935); Capron v. Douglass, 193 N.Y. 11, 85
N.E. 827 (1908).
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Leach 3 and Lewis M. SiMes.4 On the ground that the earlier American
decisions which do not support the probate court's decision were based
upon economic considerations which no longer exist, as Professors Leach
and Simes have explained in their writings, the probate court decided
what it believed should be the law today in Ohio. 'What is the law on
this point in Ohio will not be known until the Ohio Supreme Court
decides the same issue.
On the specific issue before the probate court, both Professor Simes5
and Professor Leach8 disagree with its decision.
Ohio had a special statute on perpetuities prior to 1932. No one
seemed to understand fully this statute.7 It is believed that the common
law rule against perpetuities and not this early statute applied to future
interests in personal property.8 Therefore since under the doctrine of
equitable conversion all the trust property was considered personalty, it
is possible that the present Ohio statute9 which provides that the com-
mon law rule against perpetuities applies to personalty, is merely de-
claratory of the Ohio common law. Consequently, in the instant case the
probate court might have avoided the statutory construction problem as
to the meaning of the phrase "common law rule against perpetuities" as
used in section 2131.08 of the Ohio Revised Code.
If the doctrine of equitable conversion had not applied to the trust
property in the instant case, then the probate court would have had to
apply the rule against perpetuities of Montana as to land in Montana, of
Tennessee as to land in Tennessee, and of Ohio as to any land in Ohio and
personalty. This possible situation dearly shows the-need for a uniform
rule against perpetuities. The probate court recognized from recent crti-
cisms of the common law rule against perpetuities, which the court Telied
upon for its decision, the general inadequacies of this common law rule.
The immediate problem of the lawyers of all states is the drafting of an
acceptable statutory rule against perpetuities.10
'72 Ohio L. Abs. 120, 133 N.E.2d 664 (Prob. 1955)
2 192 Wis. 486, 213 N.W 320 (1927)
'Leach, Perpetuttes ;n Perspective: Ending the Rules Reign of Terror, 65 HARv. L.
REv. 721 (1952)
'SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND (1955)
r2 SIMEs, LAw OF FUTURE INTERESTs § 528 (1936); SMEs AND SMITH, THE
LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1275 (2d ed. 1956)
56 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 24.34 (1952); MoRRIs AND LEACH, THE
RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES 138 (1956)
7PAGE'S OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 10512-8, Comment (1938).
'SIMES AND SMITH, THE LAw OF FUTURE INTEREsTs § 1438 (2d ed. 1956)
'OHIO REV. CODE § 2131.08.
"°SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE DEAD HAND 71 (1955); Leach, Perpetuities
Legislaton, Massachusetts Style, 67 HARy. L. REv. 1349 (1954); Bordwel, Per-
Uune
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Implication of Survivorship
The Ohio Supreme Court in First Nat'l Bank v. Tenney" informed
the Ohio bar first, that it is glad the bar no longer questions the validity
of a revocable trust, and second, that there is no implied requirement of
survivorship by a remainderman because his remainder is subject to being
defeated by a reserved power in the settlor to revoke or amend a trust.' 2
The court commends the classification of remainders in section 157 of
the Restatement of the Law of Property, because the use of the classifica-
tion should avoid the confusion which results from describing as a "con-
tingent remainder" a remainder which is vested but is subject to being
completely or partially divested.
The inclination to imply a requirement of survivorship is evident in
some law students who mistakenly believe that a person who has an
indefeasibly vested remainder must survive the life tenant in order to take.
Apparently, this general inclination continues when these students be-
come lawyers.
Life Estate With Power of Alienation
In Kern v. Kernla a testator who died in 1943 devised and bequeathed
,the -esidue of his personal and real property to his wife "to have the use,
control and benefit of -the same for her own support, using so much
thereof as may be necessary to care for herself both in health and sickness
so long as she may live." Testator's son had been his partner in the sheet
metal business. Therefore, before testator's estate had been administered
and at a time when the widow had ample funds for her support, the son
agreed to buy from the widow all of the real property used in the busi-
ness. The widow conveyed this real property in 1944 to the son in fee
simple by warranty deed. Five years later the son learned that his tide
might be defective. He filed a petition in the common pleas court for
a declaratory judgment to quiet his tide. The defendants to this suit
were the widow and a minor granddaughter who was represented by a
guardian ad litem. The guardian filed a general denial but the court
entered judgment in 1949 for the son.
In 1953, within one year after the granddaughter became of age, she
filed a petition to vacate the declaratory judgment of 1949 on the ground
Petaities from the Point of View of the Draughtsman, 11 RUTGERS L. REv. 429
(1956).
' 165 Ohio St. 513, 138 N.E.2d 15 (1956) This decision is also discussed in the
TRUSTS section, infra.
"RESTATEm:ENT, PROPERTY §§ 261, 318, Comment i (1940); 2 POWELL, REAL
PROPERTY § 334 (1950).
" 100 Ohio App. 327, 331, 136 N.E.2d 675, 678 (1955).
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of fraud on the court and that the court erred as a matter of law. The
common pleas court denied this petition, and the granddaughter appealed
to the court of appeals.
The court of appeals reversed the judgment of the common pleas
court because -the common pleas court erred as a matter of law and not
because of any fraud.
Ohio follows the general rule that a person who has a life estate and
an unlimited power to convey -the property by deed does not have a fee
simple absolute.' 4 Therefore the widow did not have a fee simple abso-
lute. She 'had only a life estate and a limited power to convey when
necessary for her support. From the evidence before the court of appeals,
the granddaughter had proved a prima facie case showing error of law
in the entering of the judgment in 1949. Under a liberal definition of
"necessary," the court of appeals could not sustain the exercise of the
power of sale because the widow did not need additional funds for her
support.
In view of the fact that this case is -based on the lack of power in the
life tenant to convey the tile, any bona fide purchaser of the real prop-
erty from the testator's son between 1944 and -the judgment in 1949
would not have been protected -by section 2325.03 of the Ohio Revised
Code. Title examiners will have to examine carefully the facts surround-
ing the exercise of limited powers of appointments.
The case of Erman v. Erman'5 is similar to Kern v. Kern in that it
involved a determination of the interest of a legatee who received $12,500
m cash to use and dispose of "principal and income, during her lifetime,
with full power to consume or dispose of the principal as she sees fit."
At the legatee's death any principal remaining went to named persons.
From a practical point of view, including the difficulty of tracing
personalty, whenever a testator considers the value of a gift of cash or
other personalty such as securities too s4aall to 'be included in a trust, as
in the instant case, the gift should be absolute and not for life with or
without the power to consume.
It was contended in the instant case that the legatee received absolute
title because she received a life estate and a general power of alienation
by deed. The court of appeals properly rejected this contention. In do-
ing so, the court apparently relied to some degree on a Kentucky de-
cision 86 which reduced to a life estate an apparent fee simple estate, be-
" 1 HAussER, OHIO PRACTICE § 1171 (1952); SiMES AND SMITH, THE LAW OF
FUTURE INTERESTS § 1488 (2d ed. 1956).
" 136 N.E.2d 385, 386 (Ohio App. 1956)
"Hanks v. McDanell, 307 Ky. 243, 210 S.W.2d 784, 17 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1948). For
JUne
